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ABSTRACT

posed and developed, recent research has shown that these
techniques provide limited protection against user (or host)
re-identification attacks. Existing sanitization techniques
usually deal with explicit sensitive fields in the dataset, such
as IP/MAC addresses, port number, and TCP/UDP payloads, but ignore implicit information that can be potentially extracted and used to identify an anonymized user
(or host). For an enterprise-wide network with thousands
of users, privacy analysis on wired network traces has been
widely studied to understand the severity of some potential trace-sharing risks [BÅØ05, OBA05, CWM+ 07]. However, similar research is scarce for enterprise-wide, largescale wireless networks [TYYK10, KH09]. As the edge of
the Internet is increasingly becoming wireless, and because
wireless networks have some unique characteristics, such as
user mobility, it is important to evaluate privacy threats
posed due to shared wireless network traces.
In this paper, we conduct privacy analysis on one of the
simplest wireless network traces, a user association log, collected from a large-scale WLAN. Compared to other semantically rich wireless-network traces, we would hope the simplicity of the user association log could make it more resistant to potential privacy risks. We consider the following
two questions: 1) Using only the “insensitive” information
in an anonymized user association log, is it possible to build
a unique signature for each user? These signatures, when
combined with some auxiliary information, such as a shortterm un-anonymized log, can be used to distinguish users
and infer some sensitive information from the anonymized
log. 2) If privacy breach is possible, how effective is a proposed mitigation approach in preventing an adversary from
1. INTRODUCTION
building such signatures?
In many large-scale wireless local area networks (WLANs),
In a nutshell, we make three major contributions in this
user association logs keep a record of each association and
work. First, we simulate the role of an adversary and prodisassociation event between users’ wireless devices and the
pose a “correlation attack” – a method based on Conditional
network’s access points (APs). Such traces collected from
Random Field (CRF) – that can be used to breach user priproduction networks, when made available for research, play
vacy from a released WLAN user association log. Second, we
a critical role in understanding user activity patterns, anause extensive experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness
lyzing network protocol dynamics, and evaluating the perof the CRF-based correlation attack. Using an anonymized
formance, reliability, and security of new network designs [SKJH06,campus-wide WLAN user association log with more than
dOdA09, ST07]. We, at Dartmouth College, have monifour thousand users and millions of user association records,
tored a campus-wide WLAN for almost one decade and some
and a short-term observation of the victim’s association acof our collected traces have been made public through our
tivities, we show that the CRF-based correlation attack, unCRAWDAD website [cra]. These network traces have been
der certain circumstances, can reveal the victim’s identity
extensively studied by the wireless research community and
in the released dataset with a probability as high as 70%,
have been used in more than 100 research publications.
or narrow down the victim’s identity among 20 candidates
To preserve users’ privacy, a trace publisher must sanitize
with a probability close to 100%. Third, we evaluate the
the network traces before sharing them with the public. Aleffectiveness of standard sanitization techniques, including
though many network sanitization techniques have been proUser association logs collected from a large-scale wireless
LAN record where and when a user has used the network.
Such information plays an important role in wireless network
research. One concern of sharing these data with other researchers, however, is that the logs pose potential privacy
risks for the network users. Today, the common practice in
sanitizing these data before releasing them to the public is
to anonymize users’ sensitive information, such as their devices’ MAC addresses and their exact association locations.
In this work, we aim to study whether such sanitization measures are sufficient to protect user privacy. By simulating
an adversary’s role, we propose a novel type of correlation
attack in which the adversary uses the anonymized association log to build signatures against each user, and when
combined with auxiliary information, such signatures can
help to identify users within the anonymized log. Using a
user association log that contains more than four thousand
users and millions of association records, we demonstrate
that this attack technique, under certain circumstances, is
able to pinpoint the victim’s identity exactly with a probability as high as 70%, or narrow it down to a set of 20
candidates with a probability close to 100%. We further
evaluate the effectiveness of standard anonymization techniques, including generalization and perturbation, in mitigating correlation attacks; our experimental results reveal
only limited success of these methods, suggesting that more
thorough treatment is needed when anonymizing wireless
user association logs before public release.
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generalization and perturbation, in mitigating the proposed
correlation attack; the results reveal only limited success of
these methods, suggesting that more thorough treatment is
needed when anonymizing wireless user association logs before the public release.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first present related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce how user association logs are collected in WLANs
and describe the common practice in sanitizing these data
before sharing them with the public. In Section 4, we discuss
the adversarial model and formulate the correlation attack
problem. We present in Section 5 how an adversary can use
a CRF-based technique to launch correlation attacks against
released user association datasets, and evaluate the attack
effectiveness of this method in Section 6. In Section 7, we
consider two widely used anonymization techniques, generalization and perturbation, and evaluate their effectiveness
in mitigating CRF-based correlation attacks. Finally, we
draw concluding remarks in Section 8.

2.

Previously, we speculated a potential threat against user
mobility privacy in a general sense [TYYK10]. Most close
to this work, Kumar and Helmy have recently shown that it
is possible to breach privacy from WLAN user association
logs [KH09]. Their attack model assumes that the adversary can inject data into the wireless network during the
trace collection or has some out-of-band information such
as the victim’s academic major and gender. In practice,
these conditions may be difficult to satisfy. The type of attacks we discuss in this paper, however, do not require these
assumptions.
Location privacy has been investigated in diverse communication networks in the past few years. Krumm presented
a comprehensive survey of computational location privacy,
in which users’ location data are treated as geometric information [Kru09]. Hoh et al. analyzed a set of week-long
GPS traces from 233 vehicles and showed that applying previous privacy algorithms either led to inaccurate results or
failed to provide privacy guarantees; they further proposed
an uncertainty-aware algorithm that is able to preserve privacy for all vehicles [HGXA07]. In comparison, the trace
used in our work covered thousands of users and more than
two months. Location privacy in sensor networks has also
been studied under different adversarial models [OLL+ 08,
MLW07, OZT04]. Our work differs from this line of research
because it considers location privacy in a different network
environment, which leads to a different threat model. For
example, we do not assume that the adversary is capable of
monitoring the entire network traffic in our work.
Narayanan et al. proposed a method to robustly deanonymize a large dataset [NS08]. Their work is based on
the assumption that the studied dataset is highly sparse;
for example, in their studied Netflix dataset, the number of
attributes (movies) is twenty times more than the number
of potential targets (Netflix subscribers). In our study, we
make no assumptions about the sparsity of user association
logs.
Privacy has been intensively studied for a long time in
the database field. Concepts such as k-anonymity [SS98],
l-diversity [MGKV06], t-closeness [LLV07], and differential
privacy [Dwo06] have been analyzed in a theoretical manner
under many settings [GKS08, CKLM09, BA05]. Most related techniques aim to anonymize microdata, which is represented as a tuple with multiple attributes in a database table. The user association log, however, contains information
with sequential semantics. An interesting research direction would be to develop methods to cast existing privacypreservation concepts into a framework able to deal with sequential data, as required in sanitizing user association logs
collected from WLANs, and we plan to explore further along
this line in our future work. Recently, some efforts on analyzing privacy of graph data have shown that sensitive information in social network data can be de-anonymized [ZG07,
BCKS09, NS09]. Our work differs from this line of research
because we deal with sequential activity data corresponding
to individual users instead of the social graphs formed by
the users.

RELATED WORK

To share network traces while preserving privacy, data
publishers usually define sanitization policies according to
their specific privacy concerns. These policies determine
which sanitization methods to apply and how. Many networktrace sanitization techniques and software tools have been
proposed and implemented, such as FLAIM [SLL06] and
tcpmkpub [PAPL06], to fulfill the trace publishers’ sanitization goals.
Due to the intrinsic complexity of network trace sanitization, however, recent research has revealed that there are
few, if any, available network-trace sanitization schemes that
can provide a water-tight guarantee under the worst-case
analysis. These works often mimic the role of an adversary
that tries to launch a de-sanitization attack against the sanitized trace. According to the employed attack strategies,
these de-sanitization research can be classified into two categories. Direct attacks exploit the limitations of a sanitization
algorithm [BÅØ05, OBA05, CWM+ 07]. Indirect attacks
use implicit information contained in the trace [CWM+ 07,
FMT+ 06, BMG+ 08, PGG+ 07], auxiliary information obtained from other sources [KYH08, CWM+ 07, PGG+ 07], or
new techniques from other research fields, such as machine
learning [CCW+ 07, BCKP08, PGG+ 07, BMG+ 08], to uncover sensitive information from anonymized network traces.
In the domain of wireless networks, many physical-devicefingerprinting techniques could potentially be used to launch
de-sanitization attacks [FMT+ 06, BMG+ 08, BCKP08]. Because most of these techniques work by monitoring unique
variations in protocol behaviors, such as those seen across
different vendors or device-driver implementations, they often require very-high-resolution data or even special measurement equipment. Such requirements greatly limit their
applicability for de-sanitization on most types of released
traces. Some other researchers have focused on how to fingerprint users. For instance, Pang et al. demonstrated that
by combining information from multiple sources together,
such as destination address, broadcast packet size and IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol fields, an adversary could uniquely
identify users under certain circumstances [PGG+ 07]. Their
techniques, however, rely on much more abundant trace semantics than our work and have only been evaluated with
much smaller wireless network traces than the one we used.

3.

WLAN USER ASSOCIATION LOGS

At Dartmouth College, we have been monitoring the campuswide WLAN network usage since 2001. As of January 2010,
this WLAN network consists of over 1300 Aruba APs that
provide 54Mbps coverage to the entire campus. These Aruba
2

APs are connected with and controlled by a small set of
Aruba Mobility Controllers. We poll every controller every 5 minutes using the SNMP protocol and receive replies.
In addition to traffic statistics, these replies contain a list
of devices associated with every AP. After processing these
replies, each row of the resulting user association log collected, which we call a user association record, has 4 commaseparated fields: the MAC address of the wireless card, the
name of the AP that the wireless card has connected with,
and the start and the end POSIX timestamp of this connection. The following is a snippet of the user association
log that we extract from the SNMP information (it shows
anonymized MAC addresses to protect user privacy):

each real MAC address has been replaced with a new identifier IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns ) according to some one-to-one one-way
mapping function. Hence, given an anonymized MAC address IDi , the adversary cannot find the real MAC address
that is mapped to IDi . The AP’s name can be either preserved or truncated. The rest of the fields, such as the start
and end timestamp of each connection, are preserved during
the sanitization process.
Assumption 2: The adversary knows a sequence of association records about a victim user’s device. This sequence
of records, Q, need not be collected during the same time
period as Ls (otherwise the problem will be trivial). It is
important to note that the information provided in Q can
be rather coarse. For example, the adversary may only need
to know which buildings the victim has visited rather than
001d4f3bc496,14.5.1, 1251690285,1251691544
which exact APs the victim has associated with.
002608e4cdf7,80.3.2, 1251690458,1251691544
There are a few ways for the adversary to obtain such
0021e9082bfd,142.6.1,1251689384,1251691544
information: (1) The adversary has some general knowl0016cf29eb6d,76.5.3, 1251691151,1251691544
edge about the victim. For example, the adversary knows
001cb3b51b58,188.4.6,1251689569,1251691544
the victim often stays in the library in the morning for 2
0016cf295f33,206.5.7,1251688817,1251691544
hours and then goes to the classroom around 3pm in the
afternoon. (2) The adversary can manage to install some
There are a few things worth noting. First, although it is
trojan software on the victim’s device through some social
possible that a wireless card may have been used in multiple
engineering techniques (e.g., email attachments) or exploitdevices or a device has been used by multiple people, we
ing software vulnerabilities on the victim’s device. The troassume that such cases are rare in our dataset. Hence in
jan secretly monitors the network association/disassociation
this paper we use a “wireless card” and a “network user”
activities of the device and reports them to the adversary
(or a “user”) interchangeably. Second, because the Aruba
through covert channels. (3) The adversary follows the vicMobility Controller only generates the start timestamp for
tim physically and monitors the victim’s network associaeach connection and we poll the controller every 5 minutes,
tion/disassociation activities. For instance, when the victim
the connection’s end timestamp is only an estimated value,
opens a laptop, usually the laptop will automatically find the
whose error is therefore bounded by 5 minutes. Third, we
closest AP and connect to it, which leads to an association
use a hierarchical naming scheme for APs in the dataset.
record. (4) The adversary can obtain the user association
For an AP named x.y.z, x is its building number, y is its
records of the victim user from a different dataset L0 , which
floor number, and z is its serial number within the floor.
may or may not be published by the same publisher as Ls .
Sanitization. When sanitizing the user association logs,
0
L
may be produced using a weak anonymization scheme
we use a one-to-one mapping function to rename the MAC
(or even no sanitization at all) so that it is easier for the
addresses in the original dataset. Hence, the anonymized
adversary to identify the victim’s AP association records in
MAC addresses in the sanitized dataset do not have any
it than in Ls .
physical meaning and are thus only symbolic names; a simiAssumption 3: The adversary knows that the sanitized
lar sanitization scheme has been used in other work [KH09].
dataset
Ls must contain the victim’s AP association records.
By taking advantage of its hierarchical naming scheme, we
In many cases, Ls is published at an organization level (e.g.,
truncate an AP’s name according to different sanitization
by a university) and thus contains complete AP association
levels. For example, if we want to only keep building and
logs of the organization’s wireless users. Hence, if the adverfloor information, we truncate the AP’s name from x.y.z to
sary knows that the victim was a member of the organization
x.y.
when Ls was collected, it is easy for him to know that Ls
should contain the victim’s AP association records.
4. THREAT MODEL AND PROBLEM FORGiven the three assumptions in the adversarial model, the
(exact)
correlation attack problem is then formulated as folMULATION
lows: given Ls and Q, which anonymized identity IDi (1 ≤
Complying with Narayanan’s definition of privacy breach [NS08],
i ≤ Ns ) in Ls has also generated Q? In practice, however,
the threat we study here is whether the limited insensitive
due to incomplete data for training or inference, or some
information left in a sanitized association log could still form
intra- and inter-user association activity variations, finding
implicit signatures for individual users. These implicit signaan algorithm to solve the exact correlation attack problem
tures, when combined with auxiliary information, may prois difficult or even impossible. In this work, we consider
vide the adversary the knowledge that the sanitization proa relaxed and more practical version of this problem. The
cess has aimed to protect, such as whether an anonymized
(relaxed) correlation attack problem is formulated as follows:
ID in the released dataset corresponds to a specific user. We
given Ls and Q, which subset of anonymized identities would
make the following three assumptions in our threat model:
contain the one that generated Q with high probability?
Assumption 1: The adversary has access to a sanitized
It is important to emphasize the difference between the
WLAN user association log Ls , which is shared to the public
correlation attack problem and the mobility anomaly detecby a trace publisher. There are Ns users in this association
tion problem [SYW+ 06, YES09]. The latter one is stated
log. All users’ real MAC addresses are anonymized in Ls
as follows: given the mobility history of a mobile user H,
as follows: during the trace publisher’s sanitization process,
3

is a test mobility record R generated from the same user?
Although both problems are related to human mobility, the
distinction in their conditions (i.e., prior knowledge) suggests the difference: The mobility anomaly detection problem is essentially a statistical hypothesis test, whose solution
does not require the knowledge of other users’ mobility history. In contrast, the correlation attack problem is about
classification: considering that there are Ns classes and we
know each class’s association records, we want to find the
correct class for the observed association sequence Q. Their
difference can further be explained with an example. It is
possible that the observed association sequence Q does not
exhibit the user’s regular mobility pattern and can thus be
treated as an anomaly in the mobility anomaly detection
problem. But as long as no other users have association
records closer to Q, we may still be able to find the correct
class for Q in the correlation attack problem.
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ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
Figure 1: Represent an user’s association log using
association activity template.

ure 1, the association activity tag is the name of the visited
AP. Each element in an association activity vector is called
a feature. In the current implementation, we let an activity vector have six features: duration, day of week, starting
time, previous AP, next to previous AP, and next AP . Table 1 explains these features.
Several things are worth noting here. First, an association
activity vector does not correspond one-to-one with an AP
association record (i.e., a row in the user association log).
This is because an association activity vector resides in an
association activity template that only holds association information for a specific 24-hour calendar day. Thus, if an AP
association record spans multiple days, it is divided into several association activity templates and represented by multiple association activity vectors inside these templates. The
duration feature in an association activity vector follows this
manner. If a connection is entirely contained in a 24-hour
calendar day, the value of duration is the end timestamp less
the start timestamp. If a connection spans several days, the
value of duration is equal to this connection’s cumulative
amount of time in the corresponding 24-hour calendar day.
Given the duration feature’s maximum value is 24 hours, it is
intrinsically normalized on a 24-hour base. Second, instead
of assigning an exact time (hour, minute and second) to the
starting time feature, we divide a day into six 4-hour slots
(midnight, dawn, morning, afternoon, evening, and night)
and use the name of these slots as the coarse start time.
As shown in Kim’s work [KK07], although user association
behaviors have periodic patterns, they also have some variations. Compared to the exact representation, representing
the time at a coarse level adds some tolerance for these variations. Third, at the beginning of each day, we assign a
special string “NA” to the previous AP and next-to-previous
AP features; similarly, we let the next AP feature be “NA”
at the end of a day. Fourth, if a user is offline all day, no
association activity template is generated for her that day.

Data Representation

Previously, there are two general approaches to represent user association activities: direct representation and
abstract representation. The method proposed by Song et
al. [SKJH06], for instance, is a typical direct representation
that puts all visited APs in an AP transition vector and
the corresponding duration at each AP in a duration vector.
Suppose that a user has traveled from AP1, AP2 to AP3
sequentially and connected with each AP for 30, 45, 25 minutes respectively. Then, the corresponding AP transition
vector is [AP1, AP2, AP3] and the duration vector is [30
min, 45 min, 25 min]. While this method captures every AP
association transition, it ignores other potentially valuable
information, such as when the connection took place. On
the other hand, the abstract representation method, such
as Hsu et al.’s normalized association vector [HDH07], aims
to capture the overall trend of AP association changes at
the expense of losing many details during the abstraction
process.
As the previous data representation methods ignore details that are important to classification, we propose a new
approach that uses association activity templates to represent user association logs. In this method, we first split the
user’s association log into day-to-day pieces and then for
each day build an individual association activity template,
because human activities often exhibit regularities associated with days of the week. An association activity template is a collection of association activity tags and their
corresponding association activity vectors. As shown in Fig-

5.2

Algorithm Procedure

To give a big picture about how the correlation attack
works, we describe the attack algorithm in this section and
4
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Association
activity
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The intuition behind the proposed algorithm is that human activities often follow certain regularities. These regularities are inherent in the temporal and spatial information
of the association log, whether or not the log is sanitized.
Different users may have different association patterns, and
we can use such differences to fingerprint and distinguish
users. To this end, we build a model that not only characterizes such inter-user differences but also is robust to intrauser variations. In the previous section, we formulate correlation attack as a classification problem, in which the two
key components are feature representation and the learning
algorithm. We use association activity templates to represent user association logs and employ CRF as the learning
algorithm.

5.1

AP 1

Table 1: Features of an association activity vector
Value
Comments
Feature Meaning
name
duration Adjusted con- Integer
Normalized,
nection durainspired
tion
by
Hsu’s
work [HDH07]
day of Day of the Enum.
type, To represent
week
week of this from Monday to periodic
record
Sunday
patterns,
starting Time slot of Enum.
type, inspired by
time
a day of this from Midnight Kim’s
work [KK07]
record
to Night
previous The AP in
To represent
AP
the previous
context
record
information,
String, AP’s
next-to- The AP in
inspired by
name
previous the
nextSong’s
AP
to-previous
work [SKJH06]
record
and Yamnext
The AP in the
Cha [KM00]
AP
next record
defer the introduction to CRF to Section 5.3.
Step 1. For each user in Ls , split his/her association log
into day-to-day pieces and represent each day’s log using an association activity template as described in
Section 5.1.
Step 2. Feed each user’s association activity templates into
a linear-chain CRF to model this user’s association
behavior. As there are Ns users in Ls , we build Ns
CRF models. The input fed to a CRF model is a
sequence of association activity vectors (Figure 1) and
the output is a sequence of association activity tags,
which are actually AP names. Let CRFi (V) denote the
output from the i-th user’s CRF model, where 1 ≤ i ≤
Ns and V denotes the sequence of association activity
vectors fed to the CRF model.
Step 3. For the observed user association record Q, we
preprocess it as described in Section 5.1 to obtain an
association activity template T . Let VT and GT denote
the sequence of association activity vectors and the
sequence of association activity tags in template T ,
respectively.
Step 4. We feed VT to all CRF models trained in Step
2 and count the number of tags that overlap between
GT and CRFi (VT ) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns ), a score we denote
wi . The intuition applied here is that the victim’s
CRF model is more likely to produce correct activity
association tags from her observed activity association
vectors in Q, and therefore score wi is higher than the
others if IDi is the victim’s identifier in the released
user association log.
Step 5. We sort all users based on score wi in non-increasing
order and the algorithm outputs this sorted list.
Ideally the top identifier on the sorted list should be treated
as the sole candidate that generated the observed user association sequence Q. In practice, however, due to incomplete
5

data for training or inference, or some intra- and inter-user
association activity variations, the top identifier may not
correspond to the victim who produced Q. As mentioned
earlier, we tackle the relaxed correlation attack problem
instead and thus use a small number of top identifiers on
the sorted list. Clearly, from the attacker’s perspective, the
smaller the number of top identifiers needed to include the
victim’s, the more successful his attack.

5.3

Conditional Random Field

One may wonder why we chose CRF models to characterize users’ AP association behaviors. We explain this choice
by analyzing the nature of the correlation attack problem
and also provide a brief introduction to CRF.
Let X = (X1 , X2 , ..., Xn ) denote a random variable of an
observed sequence, each element of which has k features. In
our problem, a realization of X is a sequence of association
activity vectors with the six features described in Table 1.
Let Y denote a random variable of a label sequence. A label
here is actually an association activity tag that indicates an
AP name. According to Figure 1, each association activity vector corresponds to an association activity tag. Hence,
given an observed sequence of X (i.e., sequence VT in Step 3
of the algorithm shown in Section 5.2), we need to produce
a label sequence for it. It is thus a task of assigning label sequences to observation sequences, which is common to many
applications in bioinformatics, computational linguistics and
speed recognition [DEKM98, MFP00, RJ93].
We now explain why here we do not use Hidden Markov
Model (HMM), a popular probabilistic sequence model that
characterizes the joint distribution p(X, Y ) directly [Rab89].
HMM is known to be a generative model in the field of
graphical models. The challenge facing HMM is that it has
to model the entire set of observation sequences p(X) explicitly, which is intractable in our case (and many other
domains) for two reasons. First, the limited data collected
from real-life network measurement makes it difficult to obtain a full-fledged p(X). Second, the features in X (the
features in the association activity vector) can be highly
correlated. For example, Song’s work shows that there is a
strong correlation between the lastest three APs visited by
an user [SKJH06]. Kim’s work demonstrates that the time
and the location that a user will visit may follow a periodical pattern [KK07]. Such dependences among features are
difficult to model within HMM. To circumvent the problem,
generative models like HMM and Naive Bayes make independence assumptions that may not be realistic in practice.
Note, however, that modeling the joint distribution for
X and Y (i.e., p(X, Y )) is not important for the sequence
labeling problem at all, because the observation sequences
have already been available to us. What is needed is actually finding the conditional probability p(Y |X) from the
training dataset. Although it is possible to derive p(Y |X)
)p(X|Y )
based on Bayes’ rule, the need to model the
as p(Y p(X)
marginal distribution p(X) makes it a difficult approach.
The CRF method, in contrast, eliminates the necessity of
knowing p(X) by building models to predict label sequences
Y conditional on observation sequences X. Hence, CRF is
indifferent to the dependence among features in X because
X is now treated as given (i.e., a condition). Because CRF
models the conditional probability p(Y |X) instead of the
joint distribution p(X, Y ), it is a discriminative approach
rather than a generative one.

Y1

CRF is a special type of undirected graphic model. Let
C denote the entire set of cliques, which are fully connected
subgraphs, in the graph. A clique C ∈ C contains variables
from X, denoted XC , and also variables from Y , denoted
YC . For a generic CRF, the goal is to learn the following
conditional distribution from the training data:
1 Y
p(Y |X) =
ψC (YC , XC ),
(1)
Z(X) C∈C

Label variable

where fi is a feature function and λi is the weight of feature
function fi .
There is a special type of CRF models, called linearchain CRF models, which are particularly useful for solving sequence labeling problems. Linear-chain CRF models
are conditionally trained as linear chains, instead of generic
undirected graphical models. In Figure 2, we show a linearchain CRF, where the node representing X is not generated
from the model. In a linear-chain CRF, the set of cliques C
contains every node (cliques of size 1) and every edge (cliques
of size 2) in the graph. Hence, the conditional probability
distribution is given by:
(4)

where
=

k
X
exp(
θj sj (Yi , X, i))

(5)

j=1

ψi0 (Yi , Yi−1 , X)

=

k
X
exp(
λj tj (Yi−1 , Yi , X, i)).

(6)

j=1

In the above equations, sj is a state feature function of a
label variable, and tj is a transition feature function that
depends on two consecutive label variables; θj and λj are
parameters for the linear-chain CRF. As there is no transition from Y0 to Y1 , we can simply let λ1 be 0. In this work,
we used CRFsuite [Oka07], a linear-chain CRF implementation for parameter estimation and inference, and defined
the state feature function and transition feature function
as boolean functions, which are similar to those in Sutton
and McCallun’s book [SM06]. It is worth noting that many
methods have been proposed to train linear-chain CRF models and use them for inference. Due to space limitation, we
refer interested readers to the literature for more thorough
treatment on the topic of CRF [SM06, LMP01, Wal04].

6.

Observed variable

which in total covered 62 days corresponding to one academic term. In the original dataset, there were 19,579 distinct MAC addresses, which contributed to 3,076,318 association records. Because the WLAN at Dartmouth College is
an open network, any one physically at the campus site can
use this network for free, and thus a great portion of MAC
addresses belong to visitors who have appeared in the logs
for only a short period of time. As training CRF models
for these transient users would be difficult due to insufficient data, we filtered out those users who were active in
fewer than 45 days during this 62-day period, and the resulting dataset still contained 79.67% of the user association
records with 4,285 distinct users and 1,364 distinct APs. We
used this reduced dataset for the experiments below. All the
experiments were performed on four commodity PCs, which
took around four days to finish.
We use the Minimum Size of Candidate Identifier Set
(MSCIS) as the metric to measure the attack efficiency.
Consider the relaxed correlation attack problem with a sanitized user association dataset Ls and an observed sequence
of AP association records Q. For each IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns
in Ls , we compute score wi according to Step 4 in the CRFbased method. Suppose that IDj is the user ID of the victim
who generated Q. The MSCIS is defined as the number of
user IDs whose scores are no smaller than wj . MSCIS establishes an upper bound on how many candidate user IDs
need be considered in order to contain the victim’s user ID
in the sanitized dataset. Note that if a user has the same
score as the victim’s (i.e., wj ), his ID should also be counted
into MSCIS.
We perform 10-round leave-one-out experiments. The 62day user association log is partitioned into 10 bins of approximately the same length for each user. In the j-th round
(1 ≤ j ≤ 10), we use the j-th bin of each user’s association
records as the testing dataset (Lu ) and the remaining nine
as the training dataset (Ls ) to build the CRF models. The
results shown below are the 10-round averages.
To set up a baseline case for comparison, we developed a
simple distance-based method described as follows:
Step 1. For each user in Ls , we build a time vector each
day that contains how much time this user spent at
each AP. The length of a time vector is equal to the total number of unique APs in the trace, and the number
of time vectors for a given user is equal to the number
of days that the user appeared in Ls .

i

ψi (Yi , X)

Yn

Figure 2: Illustration of linear-chain CRF.

C∈C

n
1 Y
ψi (Yi , X)ψi0 (Yi , Yi−1 , X),
Z(X) i=1

Yn−1

X=X1 , X2 , ..., Xn−1, Xn

Furthermore, ψC is a real-valued potential function on
clique C; a commonly used function is:
X
ψC (YC , XC ) = exp(
λi fi (YC , XC )),
(3)

p(Y |X) =

Y3

...

where Z(X), sometimes called the partition function, is a
normalization factor and is given by:
XY
Z(X) =
ψC (YC , XC ).
(2)
Y

Y2

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

Step 2. Similarly, we compute a set of daily time vectors
for each user in Lu .

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the CRFbased method for correlation attacks. We use the user association log extracted from the SNMP log collected at Dartmouth College between January 4, 2010 and March 6, 2010,

Step 3. For each user in Lu , we compute the Euclidean
distance between each of her time vectors and every
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of generalization-based mitigation against the proposed correlation attack.

user’s time vectors in Ls , to obtain an average score
for every user in Ls .

Generally speaking, there are four categories of approaches
to anonymizing datasets to protect privacy: suppressionbased methods remove information from the data, generalizationbased methods coarsen the level of information released in
the data, perturbation-based methods add noise into the
data, and permutation-based methods swap sensitive associations between entities [CS09]. Because the information
provided in a user association record is already limited, removing any field in it would make a released dataset hard to
use. On the other hand, the identity information in released
AP association records has been anonymized and thus swapping identity information between different users does not
prevent correlation attacks discussed in this work. Therefore, in the following we focus on analyzing the effectiveness
of generalization-based and perturbation-based methods in
mitigating correlation attacks.

Step 4. For each user in Lu , we sort the scores derived from
Step 3 in non-descreasing order to obtain a sorted list
of user IDs in Ls , then compute the MSCIS for each
user in Lu .
Figure 3 compares the results of the CRF-based method
and the distance-based method. The sanitization is done
by anonymizing only the MAC addresses but leaving the
other fields intact (other sanitization strategies will be examined in Section 7). When the length of Q is 5-6 days, the
CRF-based method significantly outperforms the distancebased method in attack efficiency: 73.21% of the 4,285 users
can be pinpointed exactly from Ls ; for 80.12% of the users,
their MSCIS is no more than 2, meaning that the victim’s
ID appears among the top two candidates according to the
CRF-based method; for 99.72% of the users, their MSCIS
is no more than 20. Hence, using the CRF-based method,
the adversary could almost surely narrow down the victim’s
possible user ID into a set of 20 candidates from the user
association dataset with more than 4,000 users.
By tuning the length of Q to different values (from 5-6
days to 2 or 3 days), we show how the amount of auxiliary
knowledge affects the attack efficiency. Clearly, reducing
the auxiliary knowledge available to the attacker (shorter
Q) degrades the performance of the attack. However, even
in the worst case here that the length of Q is only two days,
the adversary still can pinpoint her identity exactly from
Ls with probability 61.67%, and for 98.51% of the users, he
can narrow down her identity in Ls to only 20 candidates.
From the attacker’s perspective, this is favorable because
he needs to know a victim’s association activities for only a
short period to launch the correlation attack effectively.

7.

0.6

7.1

Generalization

Recall that the AP-naming scheme in the user association
logs uses a hierarchical structure: building ID, floor level,
and AP serial number. Hence, it is natural to apply generalization on the AP names. We consider two generalization
schemes here: one keeping only the building information of
each AP, and the other keeping both the building ID and
the floor level. Using these two generalization schemes, we
obtain two anonymized datasets and then apply the CRFbased method to launch correlation attacks against them.
The results, together with results from CRF without any
generalization, are depicted in Figure 4. All the experiments
in Section 7 work on the same sanitized dataset Ls and unsanitized dataset Lu (with 5-6 days) as those in the previous
section.
It is clear that applying generalization-based anonymization techniques helps mitigate correlation attacks. For instance, keeping the building and floor level information, the
probability of pinpointing the exact user is reduced from
73.21% to 70.92%, and the probability of having the victim appear among the top five candidates is reduced from
92.09% to 83.64%; keeping only the building information,
the top one and top five ratios are further reduced to 64.78%
and 74.10%, respectively. On the other hand, because keeping only the AP’s building information is the best we can do
to generalize AP names, we can see only limited effective-

MITIGATION STRATEGIES

In the previous section, we play an adversary’s role and
evaluate the effectiveness of the CRF-based correlation attack under different amount of auxiliary information. As
a network trace publisher in real life and the host of the
CRAWDAD website [cra], we are also interested in how
well standard sanitization measures can prevent such privacy breaches.
7

ness of generalization-based schemes in mitigating correlation attacks on user association logs. As a further step, one
may consider anonymizing the building information, such
as using a one-way function to rename them. Its effectiveness is, however, still questionable as Yoon’s work [YNLK06]
has shown that it is easy to re-identify the real building information even though they have been anonymized in our
previously published trace [HKAY04].

Percentage of users
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Spatial perturbation
Temporal perturbation

0.6
0.4
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Perturbation is another commonly used technique for data
sanitization. Its key idea is to add some noise into the original dataset such that user privacy can be preserved while
the usability of the dataset is still ensured. Based on the
characteristics of the user association logs, we consider two
perturbation methods: spatial perturbation and temporal
perturbation.
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of perturbation-based mitigation against the proposed correlation attack.

• The spatial perturbation method changes the AP information in the original dataset as follows. Let Si denote the sequence of user IDi ’s AP association records,
sorted in increasing order of starting timestamps. For
each record Rj in Si , we change the AP in Rj to the
AP in Rj−1 with probability 15%, change it to the AP
in Rj+1 with probability 15%, or keep it intact with
probability 70%.

User association logs collected from real-world WLANs
have played an important role in understanding these networks. Sharing them with the public, however, poses potential risks to the privacy of the users involved. In this
work, we show that people’s association behaviors form implicit signatures for individual users. When combined with
auxiliary information, such signatures can help reveal the
true identities of anonymized IDs in a sanitized WLAN user
association log. On a pessimistic note, standard anonymization techniques, such as generalization and perturbation, are
unable to mitigate such CRF-based correlation attack effectively. The results from this work call for a more thorough
study of potential privacy risks when wireless user association logs are shared with the public.

• The temporal perturbation method changes the start
and end timestamps in the original dataset as follows.
For each AP association record, we add Gaussian noise
with mean 0 and standard deviation 3600 seconds to
its start and end timestamps. During the process of
adding noise, we do it sequentially on each user’s AP
association records and ensure that the starting timestamp of the current AP association record is always
greater than the end timestamp of the previous AP
association record after noise is added.
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[BÅØ05]
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